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Abstract 
This paper explores ways in which civil conflict can be simulated using numerical 
methods. A general two-party model of conflict is developed by extending an approach 
proposed by Christia (2012), which is based on a metric of the ‘relative power’ that 
exists between the state and a rebel group. Various definitions of relative power are 
considered and one of these is chosen to illustrate different types of two-sided armed 
conflict, namely direct-fire, guerrilla and asymmetric warfare. The additional 
suggestion of Christia that random or stochastic events can lead to unexpected conflict 
outcomes is also further extended in this paper. The inclusion in the model of terms 
describing concurrent rebel recruitment of civilians and state deployment of troops are 
then described. Examples are presented for various hypothetical cases. It is 
demonstrated that numerical simulation techniques have great potential for modelling 
civil war. The Christia approach is shown to provide an excellent basis from which 
numerical models of civil conflict can be built and from which the progress of a 
conflict can usefully be visualised graphically.  
 
Introduction 
Numerical simulation (or computer-generated modelling) is a useful alternative approach for 
studying complex problems in addition to statistical modelling methods (Gilbert and Terna 
1999; Ostrom 1988). Statistical methods involve the analysis of empirical data with the aim 
of uncovering correlations that are consistent with particular theories or mechanisms. But, 
since statistical approaches are correlational and not experimental, they cannot be used with 
confidence to demonstrate causality. Moreover, since many variables and constructs in civil 
war research are measured using proxy variables, it is difficult to isolate the role of particular 
mechanisms. In general, experimental research approaches allow for more control and reduce 
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issues associated with validity, but are clearly not available, nor ethical, in conflict studies. 
Numerical simulation presents an alternative approach, which aims to uncover the underlying 
mechanisms by generating observed, macro-level phenomena (Smith and Conrey 2007). 
Unlike statistical modelling, where empirical data are processed via a statistical model and 
results produced that describe the relationships that exist within the data, simulation models 
are computer programs that incorporate the critical aspects of the phenomenon being studied 
(Groff 2007). As Doreian (2001) points out, simulation modelling tries to capture the 
generative mechanisms underlying the phenomena under study, whereas statistical modelling 
seeks a numerical summary of relationships between variables. Numerical simulations may 
therefore be regarded as simple representations of real-world systems (Gilbert and Troitzsch 
2005) and a platform to test hypotheses and predict real-world outcomes in cases where data 
are sparse or non-existent. 
Numerical models are generally used to test or falsify a theory or hypothesis and also to 
answer ‘what if?’ questions (Gilbert 2007). They can be used to test whether a theory is 
sufficient to generate an expected outcome, or if other processes are necessary for that 
outcome to be generated (Eck and Lui 2008). To build a numerical model, a theory has to be 
formalised by identifying the relevant parameters of the system, establishing the properties of 
the system and interactions within it and articulating the mechanisms underpinning these 
interactions in the form of programmed rules (Gilbert 2008). The model is validated by 
comparing generated outcomes to theoretical expectations or empirical data. Alternatively, 
numerical models can be used for prediction. In this case a facsimile model can be 
constructed which seeks to replicate the social system under study as accurately as possible 
by ‘tuning’ model parameters to match empirical data (Gilbert 2007). Different parameters 
within the model can then be manipulated so that their impact on model outcomes can be 
evaluated (Gilbert 2007).  
The accuracy of numerical modelling methods is clearly a function of the validity of the 
assumptions on which the model is based and just like statistical models, they therefore 
reflect the quality of the theoretical ideas or empirical data available (Groff 2007). All 
numerical models remain approximations of the complexity of their real world counterpart, 
since certain features of human actors (such as irrationality, perceptions and other 
psychological or emotional factors) are difficult to quantify and incorporate into a numerical 
model (Keller et al. 2010). This means that care must be taken when analysing the findings 
from numerical models. The results obtained do not represent either an absolute empirical test 
3 
 
of a theory nor produce guaranteed predictions of future events. Instead, the findings from 
numerical models should be used to indicate the plausibility of a theory or to highlight a 
range of potential outcomes given a certain set of assumptions and conditions (Groff 2007). 
The aim of this paper is to assess the potential of numerical simulation techniques for the 
modelling of civil wars. Numerical approaches have not yet been fully utilised in conflict 
research because previous studies have favoured statistical modelling methods to study 
conflict dynamics such as duration and outcome (Hegre 2004, Karl and Sobek 2004, 
Cunningham 2006, Cunningham, Gleditsch and Salehyan 2009). But statistical approaches 
cannot provide information on the underlying generative mechanisms responsible for these 
macro-effects and they inadequately capture the complex, dynamic processes inherent in civil 
wars that are often qualitatively described in conflict studies. In contrast, numerical models 
have many features that are attractive for conflict modelling. They allow not only for the 
elucidation of bottom-up generative processes, but they also capture the dynamic nature of 
conflict and allow for the influence of stochastic processes to be studied. 
The main contribution made by this paper is to highlight the utility of numerical simulation 
approaches for conflict research. A general two-party conflict model is proposed with the 
intention that it could act as a starting point from which more complex numerical simulations 
of conflict could be developed. The value of numerical models is that they can be validated 
using empirical data, allowing scholars to gain insight into the individual and group level 
generative mechanisms that drive different conflict dynamics. This aspect is particularly 
advantageous in a field, such as conflict research, where characteristics at the individual level 
are seldom specified in empirical models owing to the paucity of micro-level data.  
Numerical models also have potential to assist with out-of-sample forecasting techniques, 
which are of increasing interest to conflict scholars (Hegre et al. 2013). For example, the 
parameters of numerical models of conflict can be ‘tuned’ to match empirical data and 
numerical experiments can be performed to generate predictions under various ‘what if?’ 
scenarios. The results of these experiments could be used as a complementary tool to evaluate 
the plausibility of out-of-sample predictions. An additional advantage of numerical models in 
comparison to statistical models is that stochastic events can be easily incorporated. For the 
purposes of assisting with out-of-sample forecasting, numerical models could be used to 
perform sensitivity studies to test how robust the out-of-sample predictions obtained from 
statistical models are to different degrees of randomness. 
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In this paper, one numerical approach is examined in particular; namely that proposed by 
Christia (2012), who suggests that two-sided conflict might be modelled by using the concept 
of the relative power that exists between the state and a rebel group. In the present paper, the 
relative power concept is explored and used to provide a basis for the development of a 
general simulation model of two-sided conflict, in which different mechanisms of conflict, 
such as asymmetric conflict, are modelled.  
Previous empirical research on asymmetric conflict has focused on how particular strategies 
and conditions allow weaker rebels to prevail against stronger opponents (Arreguin-Toft 
2001, Mack 1975). In such conflicts, the rebel side is at an advantage over the government, in 
spite of their smaller size, because the government must search for their opponents before 
they can make a kill, whilst the rebels are able to make a direct-kill by targeting government 
strongholds. This mechanism was apparent in the recent Afghan conflict, in which the rebels 
were difficult to locate because they were dispersed in mountains and villages but were able 
to make direct attacks on their opponents by placing improvised explosive devices on the 
routine patrol routes of Western forces. Some empirical studies have established a link 
between geographic terrain and conflict duration (Buhaug at al. 2009, Buhaug and Lujala 
2005), but these studies have used statistical modelling methods, which are limited by the 
unavailability of data. The numerical model developed in this paper provides an obvious 
foundation from which the relationship between conflict duration and geographic terrain 
might be explored via bottom-up generative processes. 
The numerical model proposed in this paper is extended to include terms for rebel group 
recruitment and the state deployment of troops. Previous empirical research has shown that 
rebel groups typically start out weak relative to the state and launch a rebellion with the 
expectation that they will be able to mobilise troops. If the government is unable to defeat the 
rebels in the early stages of conflict, the chances of a swift resolution are remote (Bapat 2005, 
Regan 2002) and if rebels have a high mobilisation capacity relative to the state’s deployment 
of troops, rebels are more likely to win decisive victories (Cunningham, Gleditsch and 
Salehyan 2009). Conflict research has already started using survey data at the individual level 
to understand rebel group recruitment patterns, participation and attitudes, and how these 
influence civil war dynamics (Humphreys and Weinstein 2008). The present paper describes 
how these feature might be incorporated into numerical models, so that numerical 
experiments can be performed to test the effects of different rebel group mobilisation 
capabilities and strategies on civil conflict dynamics.  
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Previous numerical models of civil conflict 
The first computational models of armed conflict appeared during the Cold war era (Cioffi-
Revilla and Rouleau 2010). These early models were implemented using a system dynamics 
approach and utilised ordinary differential equations (ODEs) to model two-sided conflicts 
between a state and a rebel group (Forrester 1968; Hanneman 1988). These equations contain 
time derivatives (of troop numbers for example) and are used to describe dynamic 
phenomena, evolution and variation. ODE models have been used to model the progression 
of different types of two-sided conflict over time, including; direct-fire warfare (a type of 
battle in which each side shoots directly at the other), guerrilla warfare (where each side has 
to search for their enemy before attempting a kill) and asymmetric warfare (where one side 
adopts a direct-fire approach while the other adopts a guerrilla approach). See Lanchester 
(1956) for an early overview of these types of conflict. ODE models were often empirically 
informed by prominent insurgencies of the time, such as the Vietnamese War or the Soviet 
invasion of Afghanistan (Milstein and Mitchell 1969; Ruloff 1975; Allan and Stahel 1985) 
and they attained their greatest success in representing asymmetric two-sided conflict at a 
national level (Gilbert and Troitzsch 2005).  
Mathematical and numerical modelling of armed conflict using a systems dynamics approach 
has remained dominant until the more recent introduction of object-oriented approaches such 
as agent-based models (ABM), a particularly useful method for representing for many real-
world systems. ABM’s involve the simulation of automated agents in the context of an 
artificial environment and the analysis of macro-level patterns emerging from these micro-
level agent behaviours and interactions (Epstein and Axtell 1996; Gilbert and Troitzsch 
1999). Agents are ‘autonomous, goal-directed software entities’ that engage in behaviours 
described as condition-action-rules (O’Sullivan and Haklay 2000). Agents commonly 
represent people, but may also represent groups, organisations or governments for example. 
The characteristics and behavioural rules of agents can be assigned according to agent-type 
(i.e. government agents, civilian agents), or they can be assigned according to a known 
distribution observed in the population, or at random, so that specific societal averages can be 
modelled. Thus, ABM’s allow for heterogeneity among individuals that more closely 
approximates reality than many other computational modelling methods (Groff 2007).  
Agents interact with each other on the basis of their condition-action-rules and their 
characteristics can be dynamically changed as a result of those interactions. In effect, agents 
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are able to pass information to each other and react to that information on the basis of their 
programmed preferences, which may be fixed or acquired. This allows an examination of the 
evolution and history of the process under study, since information on the dynamics of the 
system can be collected as the ABM computer model runs (Axtell 2000). ABM is a bottom-
up approach that models global behaviour as emergent properties of local interactions 
between agents. As such it is well suited for studying complex and non-linear social 
processes, such as armed conflict, where cumulative effects are produced over a protracted 
time scale (Keller et al. 2010). 
The SUGARSCAPE model of Epstein and Axtell (1996) was one of the first ABM 
simulations of social unrest. By formalising a few simple rules, SUGARSCAPE allowed for 
the experimental investigation of some of the theorised micro-level mechanisms responsible 
for the dynamics of civil war. Subsequently, Epstein (2002) produced the first ABM 
simulations of armed conflict. These simulations modelled the emergence of rebellion and 
ethnic-cleansing behaviour as a product of the rebel agent’s perception of the police force 
numbers (i.e. the size of government forces) and intervention tactics at individual (civilian) 
level. This research was notable in that it was the first to examine the citizen-based impetus 
for rebellion and the model was generative, analysing civil conflict from an individual level 
up, as opposed to simply identifying state-level variables that increased the likelihood of civil 
war. Epstein’s model of civil conflict has subsequently been extended (Ilachinski 2004). The 
ISAAC and EINSTEIN models use a similar technique to model combat at the level of 
individual soldiers and Doran (2005) has constructed the IRUBA model which represents a 
meso-scale replication of Epstein’s model. The IRUBA model uses simple geographic 
features, such as terrain and the spatial distribution of rebel resources and troops, to test the 
impacts on model outcomes of various insurgency and counterinsurgency tactics. In a further 
model, Bennett (2008) omits variations in terrain but instead includes social emotions in the 
civilian population such as fear and anger felt against the state. This was an attempt to model 
the US military’s strategy of appealing to the ‘hearts and minds’ of the US population.  
Bhavnani et al. (2008) have created the first simulations of civil war involving state 
repression and Cioffi-Revilla and Rouleau (2010) have devised the MASON model which 
considers how political freedom within a state (i.e. the polity index) results in different 
emergent conflict outcomes. All of these numerical simulations examine the macro-level 
conflict dynamics emerging from rebel and civilian agent behaviours in two-sided conflicts.  
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The present paper builds on these previous insights by extending the approach proposed by 
Christia (2012) which is based on the metric of the ‘relative power’ between two sides. Terms 
for rebel recruitment of civilians and state deployment of troops are incorporated and ways in 
which stochastic processes can be implemented into the model are explored. 
A general numerical model of two-sided conflict 
Modelling relative power between the state and a rebel group 
Christia (2012) has proposed that the progress and outcome of a civil war can be modelled 
using a metric p, which relates to the relative power between the groups involved. In 
Christia’s model it is assumed that there are two sides at war; the government and a rebel 
group. Rebel groups are assumed to have two objectives: (i) to win the war (or at least sustain 
conflict against the state) and (ii) to maximise their returns. The metric of interest is relative, 
rather than overall, power and the basis of the model is that the evolution of relative power 
over time defines the progress of a conflict. The conflict between the government and a rebel 
group starts at t = 0, when the relative power of the government is p0 and the relative power 
of the rebel group is 1 – p0. Christia proposes that the change in the value of p throughout a 
conflict can be described by an expression that contains the sum of a deterministic component 
f(p)dt and a stochastic component Ψ(p,t). Thus; 
),()( tpdtpfdp          (1) 
where dp is the change in p over a time increment dt and f(p) is a drift term that depends on 
the current level of p, which in the absence of the stochastic term, is simply the derivative of 
p with respect to time dp/dt. Based on this deterministic component in equation (1) alone, if 
the level of p at time t0 were known, it would be possible to ascertain how p would evolve 
over time. In the model, a rebel group with an initial value p > 0.5, would eventually be 
expected to win because it would keep increasing its relative power over time eventually 
reaching p = 1. Conversely, if a rebel group were to start with p < 0.5, the rebels would 
eventually lose with the relative power reaching a value p = 0. Evidently, the rebel group 
would prefer to have a higher p at the start of the conflict because that would ensure a quicker 
victory. The deterministic function proposed by Christia (2012) must be continuously 
increasing and symmetric about p = ½ such that  f(p) > 0 for p > ½,  f(p) < 0 for p < ½ and 
f(p) = 0 for p = ½.  
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An important aspect of the concept is that the evolution of p over time is not just 
deterministic. If it were (assuming complete and symmetric information), then rational parties 
would never go to war simply because they would be able to predict the outcome of the 
conflict in advance and act accordingly. But, as represented by the second term in equation 
(1), there must also a stochastic component. This is intended to capture the inevitable 
randomness that arises in conflicts and might include battlefield mistakes, or other exogenous 
factors such as changes in external support, unexpected weather conditions, disease or other 
factors beyond the control of the actors involved. The random change in p over some time 
interval, dt, is represented by the term Ψ(p,t), where Ψ determines the amount of randomness 
in the relative power change dp. Lower values of Ψ correspond to a lower random 
component, with no randomness if Ψ = 0. Thus, for the rebel side with p > 1/2 at t0 with the 
deterministic component only, rebel victory would always be expected. But, if a stochastic 
component is included, victory need not necessarily occur. If victory does occur, it may be 
either quicker, or slower to attain than in the deterministic case alone, or indeed it is possible 
for the side that starts out weaker to emerge victorious. Christia (2012) suggests that the 
trajectory of a conflict resembles one of biased random walk, where at each time interval, 
there is a step in a direction of increased or decreased relative power that is random in part, 
but also influenced by the initial value of the relative power. 
It is thus clear that equation (1) has attractive general features that make it suitable for 
modelling conflict, namely (i) it can be used to model a range of different scenarios relating 
to power-based theories of conflict, (ii) it models civil war as a dynamic process, (iii) it 
allows randomness to be implemented in the simulation of conflict and (iv) the expression is 
highly amenable to graphical representation which means that simulated conflict processes 
can be visualised to great effect.  
If the expression is to be used effectively, the general concept proposed by Christia (2012) 
needs to be extended to include more specific aspects as follows (i) the development of 
mathematical descriptions of the deterministic function and the selection of the most 
promising possibilities, (ii) defining relative power in terms of actual parameters that could 
be used in a numerical model and that might also be amenable to statistical analysis of 
empirical conflict data, (iii) exploring the ability and utility of the expression to illuminate 
different types of warfare and (iv) investigating how terms might be included in the 
expression that account for other conflict characteristics such as government troop 
deployment and rebel group growth. These aspects are considered in the following sections.  
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Mathematical descriptions of the deterministic function  
A specific mathematical description of the deterministic function is not given by Christia 
(2012) but various functions can be chosen that satisfy the required properties of the 
deterministic component f(p). One obvious possibility is the relationship: 
)12()(  p
dt
dp
pf          (2) 
where β is a constant having units time-1. The function (2p – 1) has the properties required by 
Christia, namely that it is zero at p = ½, positive when p > ½ and negative when p < ½. For 
victory to occur when p = 1 and defeat when p = 0, the function takes the values + 1 and - 1 
respectively. It is required dimensionally to insert the term β into equation (2). This gives 
equivalent values of dp/dt of + β and - β respectively. Victory or defeat then corresponds to 
the situation where the critical rates of change ± β are reached. Although the inclusion of the 
function (2p – 1) into the expression is in accord with Christia’s proposal and provides a 
promising way forward, the symmetry of the function about the value p = ½ is arbitrary. An 
alternative and simpler representation may be useful as described by the relationship: 
ppf )(           (3) 
Unlike equation (2), which is symmetrical about p = ½, this function is symmetrical about p 
= 0, such that dp/dt = 0 when p = 0 with dp/dt > 0 for p > 0 and dp/dt < 0 for p < 0. 
Physical interpretations of ‘relative power’ 
The general concept of relative power is not defined by Christia (2012) in terms of actual 
parameters that could be used in conflict modelling, but an obvious first approach is to 
assume that relative power is related simply to the numbers of group members. Thus if there 
are N1 and N2 members in group-1 and group-2 respectively, the relative power may then be 
defined in several ways, such as the fractional values f1 = N1/(N1 + N2) and  f2 = N2/(N1 + 
N2), the differences Δ1 = N1 – N2 and Δ2 = N2 – N1, or the ratios R1 = N1/N2 and R2 = N2/N1. It 
may also be useful to normalise the Δ terms as follows:  (N1 – N2)/(N1 + N2) and (N2 – N1)/(N1 
+ N2), where the reference value is the total number N1 + N2. The implications of these 
various definitions of p are now given. If p is defined as the number of group members 
represented as a fraction of the total number of troops in the conflict, then: 
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These definitions have the properties required by suggestion of Christia, namely that p2 = 1 – 
p1, there is symmetry about p = ½ (i.e. when N1 = N2 then p1 = p2 = ½). The victory/defeat 
criteria are also identical. Thus, when N2 << N1 then 11 p , 02 p  and group-1 wins. On 
the other hand when N1 << N2 then 02 p , 12 p and group-2 wins.  
The second representation of the relative power is in terms of the (normalised) difference: 
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In this case, p2 ≠ 1 – p1 and there is symmetry about p = 0 (i.e. when N1 = N2 then p1 = p2 = 
0). When N2 << N1 then 1p  and 12 p and group-1 wins. When N1 << N2 then 
11 p and 2p and group-2 wins.  
The third representation of the relative power is in terms of the difference (N1 – N2), 
normalised instead by the total number (N1 + N2). Thus: 
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In this case, p1 + p2 = 0 and there is symmetry about p = 0 (i.e. when N1 = N2 then p1 = p2 = 
0). When N2 << N1 then 11 p  and 12 p and group-1 wins. When N1 << N2 then 
11 p and 12 p and group-2 wins. 
Finally, a simple ratio may be used to represent the relative power between groups. Thus: 
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p            (7) 
In this case, p2 ≠ 1 – p1 and there is symmetry about p = 1 (i.e. when N1 = N2 then p1 = p2 = 
1). When N2 << N1 then 1p  and 02 p and group-1 wins. When N1 << N2 then 
01 p  and 2p and group-2 wins.  
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Use of ‘relative power’ in the theoretical analysis of conflict 
In a two-sided conflict, fatalities are incurred by both sides and if there is no concurrent 
replenishment of forces, each side must suffer a decrease in their number of troops over time. 
If the attrition rate of one group depends only on the size of the other, this is known as a 
‘direct-fire’ conflict. In its simplest form this involves each side firing directly at its 
adversary, for example in a long-bow battle with lines of opposing archers, or a modern 
direct-fire tank battle (Lanchester 1956). Direct-fire conflict is governed by the coupled 
solution of the two differential equations: 
22
1 NB
dt
dN
           (8) 
11
2 NB
dt
dN
           (9) 
where (dN1/dt) and (dN2/dt) are the rates of change in numbers in groups 1 and 2 respectively. 
The killing rate experienced by one group depends only on the number in the opposing group.  
The proportionality constants B1 and B2 relate to the respective killing effectiveness of each 
side. Coupled differential equations are often difficult to solve analytically and commonly 
require numerical methods of solution. For this specific case however, the analytical solution 
of a similar system of differential equations does exist§.  
A numerical solution of equations (8 and 9) can be achieved by using the following 
computational scheme. Values of the constants B1 and B2 and the initial numbers in both 
groups (N1)0 and (N2)0 are user-defined and the numbers in each group can be set to these 
values. Using a small time increment Δt, the incremental changes in the numbers in each 
group during this interval can be computed as follows: 
tNBNN tttt  )()()( 2211        (10) 
tNBNN tttt  )()()( 1122        (11) 
                                                          
§ The solutions adapted from Kreysig (1983) are:  )cosh()()sinh()()( 01011 mtNmtNmtN    and 
 )cosh()()sinh()()( 02022 mtNmtNmtN   , where
2/1
21 )(
 BBm and (N1)0, (N2)0 are the initial 
values of group size and
01)(N
 ,
02 )(N
 are the initial rates.  
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These expressions are sequentially iterated repeatedly in the computer program and the 
elapsed time is calculated by the continuous summation of the values of Δt. The program 
output gives the time-dependence of N1 and N2 and the computation is terminated when either 
N1 or N2 reaches zero (or any other pre-defined value). The total summed time represents the 
duration of the conflict. The computational flow diagram is shown in Appendix I. 
To validate the above numerical method, the predicted variation of N1 and N2 with time were 
compared to the values obtained by evaluation of the analytical expression given in the 
Footnote. Excellent agreement was obtained. This validation of the numerical method, gives 
confidence when extending it to other types of conflict. Note that, although an analytical 
solution is available in this direct-fire case, it is regarded that the numerical scheme is 
preferable for the present purpose, since it is more amenable to modifications such as the 
inclusion of stochastic terms and the inclusion of other terms describing government troop 
deployment and rebel group recruitment. Both of these features are considered later in this 
paper.  
To investigate the utility of the various definitions of relative power given by equations (5 – 
7), the time dependence of N1 and N2 determined from numerical method can be used to 
calculate the values and time dependences of p1 and p2 as follows: 









)()(
)()(
)(
21
21
1
tNtN
tNtN
tp , 








)()(
)()(
)(
21
12
2
tNtN
tNtN
tp             (12) 
)()(
)(
)(
21
1
1
tNtN
tN
tp

  , 
)()(
)(
)(
21
2
2
tNtN
tN
tp

             (13) 
)(
)()(
)(
2
21
1
tN
tNtN
tp

  , 
)(
)()(
)(
1
12
2
tN
tNtN
tp

             (14) 
)(
)(
)(
2
1
1
tN
tN
tp  , 
)(
)(
)(
1
2
2
tN
tN
tp               (15) 
The values of p1(t) and p2(t) for these four definitions were generated to simulate a simple 
direct-fire conflict using the computational method described above. The initial size of the 
government side was taken to be N2 = 1000 in all four cases and the initial size of the rebel 
side (N1) was varied for each computation. The progress of each hypothetical conflict is 
shown graphically in Figures 1 – 4 using the four definitions of p(t) from equations (12 – 15). 
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It was assumed that B1 = B2 = 0.01 and time is represented in the normalised form (mt), 
where m = (B1B2)
-1/2, to ensure consistency with the analytical solution in the previous 
Footnote.  
 
Figure 1 Graphical representation of a direct-fire conflict using the variation of p1(t) 
and p2(t) with time from equation (12). Values for initial group sizes are N2 = 1000 and 
N1 = 800, 600, 400 & 200 respectively and the curves are labelled as values of N1/N2 
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Figure 2 As for the previous figure but using p1(t) and p2(t) values given by equation (13) 
0.0 0.4 0.8 1.2
time
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
re
la
ti
v
e
 p
o
w
e
r
0.8
0.6
0.4
0.2
 
 
 
 
14 
 
Figure 3 As for the previous figure but using p1(t) and p2(t) values given by equation (14) 
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Figure 4 As for the previous figure but using p1(t) and p2(t) values given by equation (15) 
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Figures 1 and 2 are similar in shape, but differ in the range and symmetry of p. The range is 
between +1 and -1 with symmetry about the value p = 0 in Figure 1, but the range is between 
0 and 1 with symmetry about the value p = ½ in Figure 2. Both figures show that rebel 
groups with a large initial size (e.g. troop ratio 0.8) are able to sustain conflict longer than 
rebel groups with a small initial size (e.g. troop ratio 0.2). The rebels suffer a defeat in all 
cases because they start the conflict weaker than the government.  
Figures 3 and 4 show illustrations of the same conflict but with p values defined by equations 
14 and 15 respectively. Inspection of the graphs suggests that these are less satisfactory for 
illustrating conflicts. In Figure 3, p ranges between 0 and 2, but the curves are asymmetric 
around the value 1. In Figure 4, p ranges between 1 and -2, again with the curves being 
asymmetric about the value 0. This asymmetry arguably makes this representation less 
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desirable because the curves do not convey the progress of relative power during a conflict in 
an intuitive or aesthetic manner. The definitions given by equations (12 and 13) are thus 
considered more suitable for modelling relative power and as such, the definition given by 
equation (13) is used for all subsequent simulations performed in this paper.  
Interpretation of the rate constants B1 and B2 
The constants B1 and B2 in equations (8 and 9) relate to the fighting capabilities (expressed in 
terms of the killing ‘effectiveness’) of each side in a direct-fire conflict. The products B1N1 
and B2N2 may thus be regarded as weighted numbers. Thus, for the example given by 
equations (8 and 9), the rates of loss dN1/dt and dN2/dt are equal, not when N1 = N2, but 
rather when B1N1 = B2N2. The implication is that a small group with a high B-value can 
emerge victorious over a larger group with a low B-value. In the initial proposal by Christia 
(2012), war is assumed to be equally costly for both sides and indeed in the above initial 
numerical simulations, this was implicit, in that the same killing effectiveness was used for 
both sides in all calculations (B1 = B2 = 0.01). In general this will not be the case in real 
conflicts and in this respect the present approach extends that of Christia (2012). Amongst 
other possibilities the terms B1 and B2 may also contain a time dependence reflecting the 
actor’s learning and perceptions over the course of conflict.  
In cases where B1 ≠ B2, the relative power can be represented in a modified form of equation 
(6) as follows: 
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p      (16) 
The other representations of relative power given by equations (4, 5 and 7) can also be 
modified in a similar way. For simplicity in all subsequent simulations, the values are kept 
constant at B1 = B2 = 0.01 and the definition of normalised time is mt, where m = (B1B2)
-1/2. 
The next section considers how the relative power concept may be utilised for illustrating 
other types of conflict, namely guerrilla and asymmetric warfare.   
Modelling other types of two-sided armed conflict 
A second type of conflict is guerrilla warfare (Lanchester 1956; Deitchman 1962). This 
differs from direct-fire warfare in that each opposing side has to ‘search’ for their opponent 
before firing (e.g. in jungle warfare). This means that the overall killing rate must contain a 
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term similar to that in a direct-fire type of conflict, but also reflect the fact that it must be 
moderated as the number of opponents decrease and therefore become progressively more 
difficult to find. This type of conflict is described by the following coupled equations: 
)( 1122
1 NDNC
dt
dN
           (17) 
)( 2211
2 NDNC
dt
dN
           (18) 
These equations are similar to equations (8 and 9) in that the terms C1N1 and C2N2 are 
equivalent to B1N1 and B2N2. However, the equations contain the additional terms D1N1 and 
D2N2 to describe the decrease in killing rate as the remaining number decreases. The 
corresponding constants are D1 and D2 and may be regarded as ‘search’ probabilities. The 
analytical solution of these coupled equations is complex, but numerical analysis can be 
performed relatively easily by using a method similar to that described earlier for the direct-
fire conflict. The modified forms of equations (10 and 11) shown below: 
tNNDCNN ttttt  )()()()( 121211        (19) 
tNNDCNN ttttt  )()()()( 212122        (20) 
The computational flow diagram is similar to the previous case, except that equations (19) 
and (20) are used instead of equations (10) and (11). 
In the previous case of direct-fire war, ABM’s have little advantage over numerical 
computational methods. In the case of guerrilla warfare however, ABM can be more suitable. 
One facility of ABM is that the virtual agents can be instructed to move around their 
environment randomly. They can then be instructed to engage in certain behaviours when 
they interact (collide) with other (specified) agents. Thus for a conflict involving two groups, 
government and rebel agents may be instructed to move randomly and on interaction, 
prescribed killing probabilities for both types of agent can be enabled, so that each side 
experiences a decrease in numbers of troops over time. ABM is an ideal method for 
modelling guerrilla conflict because the random motion of agents in two-dimensional space 
can be used as an analogue of the search-and-kill sequence that characterises guerrilla war.  
Both the numerical computational method and the ABM method were used to model guerrilla 
conflict. The results of the numerical method based on equations (19 and 20) are shown in 
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Figure 5, using an assumed initial size of the government forces N2 = 1000, with four 
different initial rebel sizes; N1 = 800, 700, 600 & 500. For illustration purposes, the values of 
the killing probability constants C1 and C2 were taken to be identical to the constants B1 and 
B2 used earlier for the direct-fire case. In the numerical models the search parameter values 
D1 = D2 = 0.0003 were used. These were selected by performing sensitivity analyses until the 
numerical computational method and ABM were calibrated to give identical results.  
The variation of the relative power with normalised time predicted by the numerical method 
is illustrated in Figure 5. This reveals a striking difference in the shape of the curves to those 
in shown in Figure 2 for the direct-fire conflict. The curvatures of the lines are of opposite 
sign in these two figures and this characteristic emphasises the utility of the current approach 
in the visual representation of conflict type. The ‘long-tailed’ curves for guerrilla conflicts 
reflect strikingly the increasing difficulty of eliminating the last few rebels in this type of 
conflict and demonstrate clearly why such conflicts are protracted. This contrasts sharply 
with the abrupt termination revealed for the direct-fire conflicts. 
Figure 5 Variation of p1(t) and p2(t) with normalised time for N2 = 1000 and N1 = 800, 
700, 600 & 500 respectively during a guerrilla-conflict.  
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Values of p1(t) and p2(t) were also generated using an ABM. The flow diagram for the 
computation is shown in Appendix II. The variation of relative power with time for the rebel 
groups and the government is plotted in Figure 6, derived by assuming the same parameters 
as described in the above numerical model. Although the characteristic curvatures of these 
ABM plots are similar to those derived from the numerical model, a significant difference is 
that the curves derived from the ABM are ‘noisy’. This feature results from the inherent 
stochastic nature of ABM and arises because the agents are programmed to move randomly 
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and the collisions between agents from each side, is a proxy for killing, which occurs 
according to an input value of probability. Because one set of agents have to randomly 
‘search’ for enemy agents before killing them, this effect naturally reflects guerrilla conflict. 
This ‘noisy’ nature of the curves illustrates this effect clearly. Thus, the ‘built-in’ stochastic 
effects of ABM modelling illustrate how the progress of conflicts with the same starting 
conditions can have different trajectories. Towards the end of the conflict when the numbers 
of troops are small, the level of noise increases. When values for the state and rebel groups 
sizes are small, it is clear that in some circumstances, the random features that result from 
ABM modelling, could lead to relative power curves for the state and rebel groups to ‘cross 
over’, so that an initially weaker side might emerge victorious.  
Figure 6 Results generated from an Agent-Based Model for the variation of p1(t) and 
p2(t) with normalised time for N2 = 1000 and N1 = 800, 700, 600 & 500 respectively 
during a guerrilla conflict. Note that one run for each rebel size (N1) is shown.  
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A third type of conflict is asymmetric conflict (Lanchester 1956; Schaffer 1968). Typically 
this might occur when a large force, such as the government, is matched against a smaller 
force such as a rebel group, with the latter employing guerrilla tactics and the former 
employing direct-fire tactics. In such asymmetric conflicts, the rebel side can have an 
advantage over the government, in spite of their smaller size, because the government must 
search for their opponents before they can make a kill, whilst the rebels use direct fire tactics. 
The extent of this rebel advantage depends on how difficult it is for the government to locate 
the rebels. The corresponding differential equations describing an asymmetric conflict are as 
follows: 
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)( 1122
1 NDNC
dt
dN
          (21) 
11
2 NC
dt
dN
           (22) 
Once again, a numerical solution can be achieved by using a method similar to those used 
previously. The finite difference equations corresponding to equations (21 and 22) are: 
  tNDNCNN ttttt  )()()()( 112211       (23) 
tNCNN tttt  )()()( 1122                     (24) 
Values of relative power, p1(t) and p2(t), were generated to simulate asymmetric warfare 
using equations (23 and 24). The computational flow diagram is again similar to the previous 
case except for the use of these two equations. In this evaluation, the government side was 
assumed to adopt a search-then-kill strategy (with a search probability D1 = 0.0003) and the 
rebels a direct-fire approach. The initial size of the government side was N2 = 1000 and four 
different initial rebel sizes were assumed; N1 = 800, 600, 400, 200. The results are plotted in 
Figure 7.  
An important feature of asymmetric warfare (Figure 7) compared to direct-fire (Figure 1) and 
guerrilla warfare (Figure 5), is that the rebels can emerge victorious despite starting out 
weaker than the government. Figure 7 shows, for the present choice of parameters, that rebel 
victory ensues in all cases, even when they start the conflict with a troop size ratio of 0.2. The 
victory of the initially weaker side also manifests itself in Figure 7 by the curves intersecting 
and crossing. This figure again illustrates the use of the present relative-power approach in 
producing highly visually-effective representations of conflict progress. The classic empirical 
case of asymmetric conflict is the Vietnamese-US war (Mack 1975; Paul 1994; Arreguin-Toft 
2001). The present analysis produces a new representation of asymmetric concept based on 
the current extension to the relative-power approach proposed by Christia (2012).  
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Figure 7 Variation of p1(t) and p2(t) for N2 = 1000 and N1 = 800, 600, 400 & 200 during 
an asymmetric conflict with a ‘search’ probability D1 = 0.0003. Each pair of lines cross 
in this example, indicating that rebel victory occurs in all cases 
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Figure 8 illustrates the results of a repeat evaluation of that represented in Figure 7 using 
identical parameters, except that D1 is increased by a factor of 5. This causes a major change 
of conflict outcome compared to that illustrated in Figure 7. Only the single case (where N1 = 
800) now results in a rebel victory. These curves clearly illustrate the expectation that when 
rebels are easier to find (i.e. for larger D), their advantage is diminished. A further important 
point is that the curves in Figure 8 for cases where rebels suffer defeat have the same sign for 
their curvature as those for guerrilla warfare (see Figure 5). Thus for cases where rebel defeat 
ensues, the curves for asymmetric warfare and guerrilla warfare are similar.   
Figure 8 As for the previous figure but with D1 increased by a factor of 5. In this case, 
rebel victory now occurs only for the largest rebel group size  
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Inclusion of stochastic effects 
Christia (2012) suggests that the time variation of the relative power p during a conflict is 
unlikely to be smooth, but may be likened to a biased random walk, where random changes 
occur in the direction of increased or decreased relative power. The general ‘drift’ direction is 
driven at the onset by the initial values of p, but random influences are likely to occur over 
time. The ABM for guerrilla conflict illustrated in Figure 6 clearly shows the importance of 
such stochastic effects, but the numerical evaluations performed so far have not included any 
attempts to model stochastic terms. It is important to re-emphasize the importance of the 
stochastic term in equation (1). In its absence, conflict outcomes would always be predictable 
if the initial conditions were known. In principle, there would be no need for a conflict.  
Christia does not suggest how the stochastic term could be implemented practically for the 
purposes of illustrating conflict dynamics. This section examines some specific ways in 
which such a term might be applied to deterministic models of two-sided conflict. These are 
not intended to model actual physical processes that might occur, but are simply used to 
illustrate the above important point, namely that random events can produce unexpected 
outcomes. The next section considers how randomness might be introduced into the value of 
the probability parameters (B1 and B2 or C1 and C2) and is followed by a consideration of how 
randomness could be introduced via sudden changes that might occur in the number of 
troops. 
In the first instance, random changes were incorporated into the term describing the ‘killing’ 
probability. This is achieved by putting a degree of randomness into the constants B1 or B2 in 
equations (8) and (9). Since these are related to the fighting capability of a group, the real-life 
interpretation of this might be the unexpected acquisition of military equipment and arms 
from an external source, or indeed the unexpected loss of equipment and arms as a result of 
bad weather, bombardment or looting. One way in which the randomness can be incorporated 
is by changing the values of B1 and B2 after each time step Δt in the numerical computation, 
using the uniform distributions defined by the relationships: 
      
lowerupperlower
BBUBB 1111        (25) 
      
lowerupperlower
BBUBB 2222        (26) 
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where 0 ≤ U ≤ 1 is a random number and (B1)lower, (B2)lower, (B1)upper and (B2)upper  are the 
lower and  lower limits for the range of values for any given illustration.  
Figures 9 – 11 show the effect of applying the above stochastic variation to the killing 
probability of just the rebel side, for the cases of direct-fire, guerrilla and asymmetric warfare 
respectively. A random increase or decrease in the killing probability of the rebels was 
introduced after each time step of the computation according to equation (25). In the previous 
simulations constant values B1 = B2 = 0.01 were assumed. In this simulation it was assumed 
that (B1)lower = 0 in all cases and (B1)upper = 0.05 for the direct-fire conflict (Figure 9) and 
(B1)upper = 0.04 for the guerrilla and asymmetric conflicts (Figures 10 and 11). Once again N2 
= 1000 and N1 = 800, 600, 400 & 200.  
Consider the results obtained for the specific evaluation illustrated in Figure 9. Comparing 
this to the equivalent but entirely deterministic case shown in Figure 1, reveals that the 
stochastic contribution described above does not change the rebel outcome for N1 = 600, 400 
& 200, but slightly increases the timescale over which the conflict is sustained. For the 
largest rebel group (N1 = 800), inclusion of the stochastic term now results in rebel victory. 
Inspection of Figures 10 and 11 (compared with Figures 5 and 8) reveals a similar effect. For 
the case of guerrilla warfare shown in Figure 10, the rebels have emerged victorious for N1 = 
800 & 600, unlike the outcome illustrated in Figure 5, where all rebel groups suffered defeat. 
In Figure 11, for the case of asymmetric conflict, the rebels achieve victory for N1 = 800, 600 
& 400, unlike the outcome in Figure 8, where victory occurred only for the largest rebel 
group, N1 = 800.  
Figure 9 Variation of p1(t) and p2(t) for N2 = 1000 and N1 = 800, 600, 400 and 200 during 
a direct-fire conflict with a stochastic element applied to killing probability (B1) of the 
rebel side, resulting in rebel victory for the largest group 
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Figure 10 Variation of p1(t) and p2(t) for N2 = 1000 and N1 = 800, 600, 400 & 200 during 
a guerrilla conflict with a stochastic element applied to killing probability (C1) of the 
rebel side only. Rebel victory occurs for the two largest groups 
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Figure 11 Variation of p1(t) and p2(t) for N2 = 1000 and N1 = 800, 600, 400 & 200 during 
an asymmetric conflict with a stochastic element applied to killing probability (C1) of 
the rebel groups only. A search probability is applied to just the government side with 
the value 1.5 10-3. Rebel victory occurs in three cases 
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An alternative approach to implementing stochastic effects is to introduce random changes to 
the number of troops of one or both sides (i.e. add randomness to either N1 or N2). The real-
world interpretation of this might be a sudden increase in troops as a result of access to 
mercenaries, or a decrease in troops as a result of disease. Unlike the previous case, where 
randomness was applied to the search probability, a different strategy is necessary in the case 
of adding stochastic changes to group numbers. An obvious possibility is to simply add or 
subtract a fixed random component ±ΔN to the troop and/or rebel group size after each time 
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increment Δt of the computation. It is unlikely however that this ‘Brownian-type’ of 
randomness would occur in the real-world situation and a power-law relationship is more 
likely. A power law distribution is described by the function: 


x
xf )(           (27) 
where κ is a constant and α is the power law exponent. This type of distribution is common in 
nature and is characterised by a high frequency of small values, an intermediate frequency of 
medium-sized values, with large values occurring more rarely. Power-law distributed random 
values of a variable z in the range zmin ≤ z ≤ zmax can be generated from the standard 
relationship: 
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

1
maxmin
maxmin
)1( 








zUUz
zz
z         (28) 
where 0 ≤ U ≤ 1 is a uniformly distributed random number.  
To obtain the stochastic contribution for incorporation into the present model, values of z 
were calculated from equation (28) after each time step (Δt) in the computation. The random 
value ΔN = z(N1)init was then determined, where (N1)init is the initial number in the rebel 
group. A second (uniformly distributed) random number in the range 0 ≤ U ≤ 1 was then used 
such that if U ≥ 0.5, then ΔN was added to N1 or was subtracted otherwise. It was assumed 
that α = 2, zmin = 0.0001 and zmax = 1.   
Once again, it was assumed that the group sizes were N2 = 1000 and N1 = 800, 600, 400 & 
200. A direct-fire conflict was assumed for illustration and results are shown for a typical 
evaluation in Figure 12. By comparison with the direct-fire conflict with no stochastic term 
illustrated in Figure 1, it is clear that inclusion of the stochastic term can lead to rebel 
victories (intersecting curves are observed for two cases) that would not be expected from 
predictions based on deterministic calculations alone. No equivalent illustrations are given 
here for guerrilla and asymmetric conflict, but the general message is clear, namely that 
stochastic effects can give rise to radically different conflict outcomes.  
It is important to reiterate that the examples shown are driven by parameter values, which 
were selected by performing sensitivity studies. Their purpose is to demonstrate the scope of 
the various models, not to demonstrate what might happen over a number of experimental 
25 
 
runs. That is, with the parameter values selected for the experiment shown in Figure 12, it is 
possible to observe a cross-over effect, where the group who starts off weaker (in this case, 
the rebels) may emerge victorious as a result of stochastic effects. 
Figure 12 Variation of p1(t) and p2(t) for N2 = 1000 and N1 = 800, 600, 400 & 200 during 
a direct-fire conflict with a stochastic element applied to the rebel groups only (N1). 
Rebel victory ensues for the two largest rebel groups 
0.0 0.5 1.0 1.5 2.0 2.5
time
-1.0
-0.5
0.0
0.5
1.0
re
la
ti
v
e
 p
o
w
e
r
0.8
0.6
0.4
0.2
 
Inclusion of rebel recruitment and government deployment 
The types of conflict described above, involve only the attrition of two opposing groups and 
in the absence of stochastic changes in troop numbers, it is assumed that there is no 
replenishment of state or rebel group members during the conflict. In most real-world cases 
however, numbers are likely to be replenished in various ways. This can be modelled by 
including one or more of the following possibilities: i) instantaneous increments of troop 
numbers occur, ii) time-dependent increases of troop numbers occur iii) increases of troop 
numbers occur in response to the size of the opposing group and iv) time-dependent increases 
of troop numbers occur either in response to (or independent of) the size of the opposing 
group, but with a time-lag.   
In either ABM or ODE models, items i) and ii) can be modelled simply by allowing either an 
instantaneous step increase in numbers at specific times, or enabling a time-dependent 
increase as the computation progresses. Items iii) and iv) can be modelled by incorporating a 
term that allows for a rate of increase in group numbers that is driven by the number in the 
opposing group. Note that the inclusion of troop replenishment in conflict models represents 
an important novel contribution of the present work. This represents an important 
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contribution that emphasises the efficacy of the Christia relative power concept in graphically 
representing the progress of conflicts. 
Consider first the growth of a rebel group with no attrition by an opposing force. If the 
growth follows the ‘limited growth equation’ described in Appendix III, then the growth rate 
is given by the expression: 
)( 1max11
1 NNNA
dt
dN
         (29) 
where Nmax is the maximum number of potential rebel recruits in the population and A1 is a 
recruitment rate constant. Thus, in order to model an asymmetric conflict with concurrent 
rebel recruitment, the growth rate can be incorporated into equation (21) to give the overall 
rate of change of rebel group numbers as follows: 
11221max11
1 )()( NDNCNNNA
dt
dN
       (30) 
During a conflict it is likely that the state will respond to increases in the rebel threat by 
increasing its own strength. One of the possible strategies listed at the beginning of this 
section is for the state to increase its troop numbers at a rate proportional to the current 
number of rebels (i.e. proportional to A2N1, where A2 is a deployment rate constant). This 
response term can be incorporated into equation (22) to give the overall rate of change of 
state troop numbers as follows: 
1112
2 NCNA
dt
dN
          (31) 
Note that the ‘loss’ terms (C2N2), D1N1 and C1N1 in equations (30 and 31) are those described 
earlier in this paper for an asymmetric conflict. That is, the state troops are killed by a direct-
fire process and the rebels by a search-and-kill, guerrilla strategy. Since asymmetric fighting 
is common to contemporary civil wars this is assumed for all subsequent numerical 
experiments. 
The progress of a hypothetical conflict with concurrent recruitment of the rebel group and 
deployment of state troop numbers in response is shown in Figure 13. The various constants 
were chosen to illustrate the important case that even if the state initially outnumbers the 
rebels (in this case by a ratio 20:1) the rebels can emerge victorious because of their high rate 
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of concurrent recruitment. The following values were used: Nmax = 2000, N1 = 100, N2 = 
2000, A1 = 10
-5, A2 = 5 x 10
-2, C1 = C2 = 1 x 10
-2 and D1 = 3 x 10
-4. In Figure 14, the time-
dependence of the state and rebel numbers during the course of the above conflict are shown 
represented as a fraction of their initial numbers.  
Figure 13 Variation of relative power for the state and a rebel group in an asymmetric 
conflict with concurrent rebel recruitment and state deployment. In this example the 
rebel group gains victory even though it is outnumbered initially in the ratio 20:1  
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Figure 14 Time-dependence of the state and rebel numbers during the course of the 
conflict illustrated in the previous figure. Numbers are represented in terms of the 
fractions of their initial values 
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A further evaluation was performed, identical to that above, except that D1 was increased by 
a factor of ten, which means that rebels are easier to locate by the state. Results are plotted in 
Figure 15, which shows that the outcome changes from a rebel victory to a state victory. In 
Figure 16, results are re-plotted in terms of the variation of troop numbers with time. In this 
particular case, state numbers remain almost unchanged throughout the conflict.  
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Figure 15 As for the hypothetical conflict illustrated in the previous two figures, except 
that the constant D1 was increased by a factor of ten. This now results in state victory 
since rebel troops are now easier to find 
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Figure 16 Results for the previous figure, plotted as the variation of troop numbers, 
normalised in terms of the initial number, as a function of time 
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The influence of reducing the initial state strength on the outcome of a conflict otherwise 
similar to that described above is illustrated in Figure 17, where the ratio of state to rebels 
was changed from 20:1 to 6:1. The state still emerges victorious, but the conflict is more 
protracted than in the previous example. Figure 18 shows the variation of troop numbers, 
normalised in terms of the initial number, as a function of the normalised time. Figure 19 
illustrates the effect on the outcome of the previous conflict if the value of the state 
deployment constant (A2) is reduced by a factor of 10. The rebels are now victorious because 
the state cannot deploy enough troops to successfully overcome the rebels. Figure 20 shows 
the variation of troop numbers with time for this conflict. Comparison with Figure 18 shows 
that the curves representing the state and for rebels become inverted.  
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Figure 17 Effect of decreasing the initial state strength. The value of the rebel/state ratio 
is 1/6, compared to the value 1/20 used for the previous conflict 
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Figure 18 Results for the previous figure, plotted as the variation of troop numbers, 
normalised in terms of the initial number, as a function of time 
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Figure 19 Influence of reducing the state deployment constant by a factor of 10, in the 
previous conflict. Compared to Figure 17, the outcome is reversed; rebel victory occurs 
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Figure 20 Variation of normalised state and rebel troop numbers with normalised time 
for the previous conflict  
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Concluding remarks 
This paper has explored various ways in which two-sided civil conflict can be modelled using 
numerical simulation techniques. The approach proposed by Christia (2012) based on a 
metric of relative power has been extended. General numerical models of two-sided conflict 
were developed to test the efficacy of the Christia approach in illustrating the progress of 
conflict. Various aspects were investigated, including the optimal definition of relative 
power, the different mechanisms of two-sided conflict (direct-fire, guerrilla and asymmetric 
warfare), the inclusion of a stochastic element (both to the number of rebel troops and the 
rebel group killing constant) and inclusion of terms for rebel recruitment and the deployment 
of government troops.  
A comparison of ordinary differential equation (ODE) modelling and agent-based modelling 
(ABM) allowed an assessment of the suitability of these two types in different contexts. 
ABM was found to be particularly suited to the modelling of guerrilla warfare due to an 
inherent feature of ABM programming software, where agents can be programmed to move 
randomly and collide with other agents (thus replicating the search-and-kill characteristic of 
guerrilla warfare). ABM was found to be less advantageous to modelling direct-fire and 
asymmetric warfare because both of these types of warfare involve a direct-fire mechanism 
on at least one side. Since a direct-fire mechanism does not require the agents to search for 
their opponent before more making a kill, the random movement of agents around an 
artificial environment (which is inherent in ABM) is superfluous.  
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Overall, this paper has shown that Christia’s general concept provides a sound basis from 
which numerical models of conflict can be developed. The metric of relative power and how 
it varies throughout a conflict, provides a highly effective and clear visual representation of 
conflict dynamics, namely duration and outcome. Striking visual differences are apparent in 
the characteristic curves representing the different types of conflict.  
Contemporary civil wars are often asymmetric; meaning that conflicts last longer because the 
rebel agents become increasingly difficult to locate as they decrease in number. This means 
that rebels are at a significant advantage despite their small number. This mechanism explains 
why some conflicts involving weak rebels become protracted. This paper has shown that 
implementing a random element to numerical models of conflict can dramatically change the 
duration and outcome of war. Similarly, the effects of rebel recruitment and government 
deployment are shown to have important influences on conflict dynamics in ways that might 
be expected intuitively.   
Future research should also utilise the models of two-sided conflict presented in this paper to 
uncover the micro-level mechanisms underlying real-life conflicts. To accomplish this, 
sensitivity studies could be performed and the various model parameters could be tuned, or 
set according to empirical distributions, so that the simulated conflict outcomes match those 
observed in empirical data. It might then be possible to gauge what micro-level factors lead to 
certain macro-level war dynamics. Future research could also utilise numerical models to 
assist with out-of-sample forecasting. In this case, numerical models could be used to assess 
the plausibility of predictions obtained from statistical models and to ascertain how robust 
predictions are to random events.  
The numerical models presented in this paper are limited to the assumption of two-sided 
conflict, but they are highly amenable to be extended to consider the case of multi-party 
conflict, with multiple rebel groups fighting the state simultaneously (or sequentially).  Such 
multi-party models can be extended further to simulate rebel group interaction strategies 
during conflicts. These include strategies such as alliance formation and inter-rebel violence. 
The influence of group interactions on conflict dynamics could then be compared to the 
results of statistical analyses of real conflicts. 
The current models are also limited to wars of total attrition and as such, they represent 
conflict progression in situations where bargaining has failed and negotiated settlements are 
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not reached. However, the models have the flexibility to be easily adapted to explore 
bargaining theories of war. This presents obvious avenues for further research, where 
negotiation subgames between the actors could be incorporated with ease. These outcomes of 
these bargaining subgames could be explored by incorporating them with various assumed 
scenarios. For example, they could be assumed to occur at arbitrary time points, or when the 
relative power between the two sides reaches some defined threshold, or possibly when the 
rate-of-change of relative power exceeds a threshold. Probabilities within these bargaining 
subgames could then be tuned so that the occurrence of negotiated peace settlements 
predicted by the numerical models match those observed in empirical data. 
It is clear that the models provide a firm foundation from which to build-in a wide variety of 
further adaptations and incorporate other aspects. The extension of the models to multi-party 
conflict is an obvious step forward, but amongst many other possibilities, the constants used 
in the models for illustration in this paper, may themselves have a time (or even group size) 
dependences. These may be associated with the change in perceptions, learning and skills of 
actors throughout the conflict. These features can be incorporated with ease and provide a 
further flexibility when tuning the model to real empirical data.  
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Appendix I. Flow diagram of computational scheme used to generate p1(t) and p2(t) 
values for equations (12 – 15) plotted in Figures 1 – 4.  
 
 
START 
Initialise variables 
N1 = 800 
N2 = 1000 
B1 = 0.01 
B2 = 0.01 
t = 0, Δt = 0.1 
 
killrate1 = -B2 * N2 
killrate2 = -B1 * N1 
 
ΔN1 = killrate1 * Δt 
ΔN2 = killrate2 * Δt  
 
N1 = N1 + ΔN1 
N2 = N2 + ΔN2 
 
t = t + Δt 
END 
No Yes 
Use equation 
12? 
Use equation 
13? 
Use equation 
14? 
If 
N1 > 0 and N2 > 0 
No 
No 
No 
Use equation 15 
 
p1 = (N1 – N2) / (N1 + N2) 
p2 = (N2 – N1) / (N1 + N2) 
p1 = N1 / (N1 + N2) 
p2 = N2 / (N1 + N2) 
 
p1 = (N1 – N2) / N2 
p2 = (N2 – N1) / N1 
 
p1 = N1 / N2 
p2 = N2 / N1 
 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
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Appendix II. Flow diagram for ABM used to generate p1(t) and p2(t) values for guerrilla 
warfare plotted in Figure 6.  
 
START 
Initialise variables 
breed = rebel = N1 = 800 
breed = government = N2 = 1000 
C1 = 0.01 
C2 = 0.01 
 
All agents move forward 1 assuming 
Brownian motion 
Eliminate government agent 
according to kill probability = C1 
END 
No Yes 
Place all agents in their environment 
at random x, y coordinates 
If  
breed = rebel   
 
If 
 government agent 
nearby   
 
If 
 rebel agent  
nearby   
 
Eliminate rebel agent according 
to kill probability = C2 
 
If 
government  
agent eliminated 
If 
rebel agent  
eliminated 
If 
N1 > 0 and N2 > 0 
 
No No 
Yes No 
Yes Yes 
Wait Wait 
 
No No 
N1 = N1 – 1 
N2 = N2 – 1 
 
Yes Yes 
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Appendix III. The modelling rebel group growth 
The growth of a rebel group can be likened to the spread of an infection through a population, 
such that existing group members (or infected individuals) recruit (or infect) others. Such a 
process can be described by the logistic (or limited growth) equation (Turner et al. 1976). 
The rate of growth of recruited members (dN/dt) might then be modelled by the equation: 
NNNA
dt
dN
)( max1          (A.1) 
where Nmax is the maximum number in the population available to be recruited and A1 is a 
rate constant. In the early stages, when N << Nmax, this equation takes the approximate form: 
NNAdtdN max1)/(  , which has the solution: )(exp max10 tNANN  , where N0 is the group 
size at t = 0. This exponential growth continues until the term (Nmax – N) in equation (A.1) 
becomes increasingly important and the growth rate then decreases, eventually approaching 
zero as maxNN  . Note that when N = N0 the initial growth rate is (dN/dt)0 (= 0N ), so that 
the rate constant can be expressed in the form
00max01 )( NNNNA 
  and equation (A.1) can 
then be rearranged to give:  
maxmax0
max
0
0
max /1
/1
N
N
NN
NN
N
N
N
N










       (A.2) 
The solution of this equation gives the time dependence of the group size as follows (Turner 
et al. 1976): 









)/1(
exp)1(1
1)(
max00
0
0
maxmax
NNN
tN
N
NN
tN

     (A.3) 
This equation represents an S-shaped growth curve and is illustrated in Figure A.1. The group 
size and time are plotted in the normalised forms )/()( 0max0 NNNN  and 
)/1/()/( max000 NNNtN 
  respectively.  
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Figure A.1 Group size as a function of time according to equation (A.3). The size and 
time are expressed in the normalised forms as given in the text 
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Agent-Based Modelling of Group Growth 
Agent-based modelling (ABM) can be used as an alternative to the deterministic method 
described above. Here the growth of a single rebel group is modelled to reproduce and 
therefore validate the deterministic method described above. At the onset (t = 0), Nmax agents 
were programmed to move by random motion over a two-dimensional surface. Of these 
agents, a number N0 carried the attribute ‘recruited’. On collision with a ‘non-recruited’ 
agent, that agent was recruited and therefore gained the attribute ‘recruited’ according to a 
user-input value of the probability 0 ≤ P ≤ 1. The program produced an output of rebel 
number versus time.  
A set of growth curves obtained by this ABM are shown in Figure A.2 using the values Nmax 
= 1000 and N0 =50. The initial rate 0N
 was determined from the average initial rate 
determined from 15 runs of the program. The value of A1 was then calculated from the 
expression given earlier, namely: 
00max01 )( NNNNA 
 . The growth curve determined from 
deterministic methods, reproduced from Figure A.1, is shown for comparison. The curves are 
in good agreement, thus validating the compatibility of the two methods. 
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Figure A.2 Comparison of rebel group growth curves obtained by ABM and those 
predicted by equation (A.3) 
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